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Using the different response timings of credit demand and supply, we 
isolate supply shifts after monetary policy shocks. We show that the 
bank lending channel exists in Brazil:  after an increase (decrease) in 
the basic interest rate (Selic), banks reduce (increase) the quantity of 
new loans and raise (lower) interest rates. However, contrary to the 
empirical literature for the US, we find evidence that large banks react 
more than smaller ones to monetary policy shocks. Results may have 
important implications for monetary policy transmission in light of the 
recent wave of concentration in the Brazilian banking industry.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy affects economic activity through different channels. One 
mechanism is the credit channel, i.e., how monetary policy impacts the real sector 
through its effect on the functioning of credit markets (Bernanke and Blinder [1988], 
Bernanke and Gertler [1989], Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [2000] and Kyiotaki and 
Moore [1997]). There are two types of credit channels: the broad credit channel and the 
bank lending channel. The former is the channel through which monetary policy affects 
the balance sheet of lenders and borrowers in the economy.  
Banks fund a significant part of their operation issuing deposits, normally the 
cheapest way to get funding.  Assuming that deposits and other source of funding are 
less-than-perfect substitutes, monetary policy, insofar as it affects the amount of deposits 
in the banking system, will shift the supply schedule of bank credit, a transmission 
mechanism known as the bank lending channel.  
Bernanke and Blinder [1992] first tried to identify the bank lending channel by 
looking at the relationship between monetary policy shocks and future amounts of loans. 
Interpretation of their empirical results is blurred by the fact that, several months ahead of 
a monetary policy shock, aggregate lending changes because of both supply (bank 
lending channel) and demand reasons (changes in investment and consumption 
decisions). In other words, one cannot disentangle demand and supply reactions to 
monetary policy with low frequency data (quarterly in the case of Bernanke and Blinder 
[1992]). Kashyap, Stein and Cox [1993] also use quarterly data but look into the impact 
of monetary policy on commercial papers, a substitute for bank loans. Contractions in 
monetary policy are associated with increases in future quantities of commercial paper, 
supporting the idea of a supply shock. However, identification remains unsatisfactory. 
Focusing the empirical analysis on quantities does not exclude the possibility that 
demand for bank credit and commercial papers react differently to shocks in monetary 
policy.  
Dissatisfaction with identification based on aggregate data led to the use of bank-
level data. In a seminal work, Kashyap and Stein [1994] (KS hereafter) use bank 
characteristics to identify the bank lending channel. They assume that smaller banks,   3
relatively to larger ones, have more difficulty raising funds in money markets. In this 
case, differences in reactions of small and large banks to changes in monetary policy may 
be interpreted as evidence of the bank lending channel. Kashyap and Stein [2000] and 
Arena et al [2007] are additional examples of such strategy.  
Kashyap and Stein [1994], Kashyap et al [2000] and Arena [2007] all rely on 
theoretical arguments that bank characteristics are informative about the bank’s ability to 
substitute away from deposits. Thus, they always test a joint hypothesis of “bank lending 
channel plus larger-banks-can-better-substitute-deposits theory” is correct. Furthermore, 
even if the theory is correct, banks with different characteristics serve different clients 
(Berger et al [2005]). Large banks tend to serve large corporations and smaller banks tend 
to supply credit to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Large corporations have 
better access to capital markets than SMEs. Thus, large corporations have a more elastic 
credit demand than SMEs, and large banks would lose market share to bond markets if 
they tight credit concession in response to a shock in monetary policy.
1 In this case, 
differences in bank market structure for SMEs and corporations rationalize KS [1994, 
2000] results without the bank lending channel being operative. 
We contribute to the empirical understanding of the bank lending channel by 
employing a sharper identification strategy. Besides bank-level data, we use very high 
frequency data, loan-type information to isolate supply shocks driven by monetary 
policy. Our method bypasses both concerns with KS’s identification strategy. We have 
daily bank-level data on interest rate and quantity. The high frequency of the data is used 
to isolate supply from demand shocks. The key identifying assumption is that supply 
reacts faster than demand to monetary shocks. Demand for credit depends on investment 
and consumption decisions that do not react immediately (our estimation window is very 
short, of just a few days) to changes in monetary policy. In contrast, banks’ costs of funds 
increase immediately (on the following working day) to an increase in the basic interest 
rate, especially for short maturity loans such as working capital, or some types of 
consumer credit. Thus, by looking at a short window around the monetary policy 
committee meeting, we hold demand constant. This is our identification assumption. 
                                                 
1 If shocks to monetary policy increase the cost raising capital in all funding markets (equity, bond and 
bank credit) commensurately, then corporations and SMEs would have equal bank credit demand 
elasticities.    4
Thus, reduced-form estimates of the impact of changes in the monetary policy on 
equilibrium amounts and interest rates can be interpreted as supply shifts.  
Other features of our data help in identifying the bank lending channel. First, and 
differently from the literature, we use data on both new loans and interest rates. Shifts in 
credit demand and supply caused by monetary policy have, in theory, opposite effects on 
credit interest rate. Through the demand channel, a tightening of monetary policy reduces 
the equilibrium rate. Through the supply channel, interest rates increase. Hence, we 
corroborate our identification strategy by looking at the sign of the reduced form impact 
of monetary policy on lending rates. Second, we use data on several types of loans. The 
literature’s goal (ours included) is to estimate a shift in supply by computing before and 
after quantities (and, in our case, interest rates). However, this object is conditional on 
demand elasticity. Therefore, the bank lending channel could be very different for 
different types of credit. In fact, when decomposing the response to monetary policy 
according to the size of the bank, quantity responses may differ because demand 
elasticities are different. Then, by looking at the same product across banks, we are able 
to estimate the decomposition according to bank characteristics without confounding 
different demand elasticities. Third, estimation by product type is also important for clean 
identification based on high frequency. Identification is cleanest for products with a short 
maturity because their relevant cost of funds is strongly linked to short-term rates. 
We have two important findings. First, we document the bank lending channel 
directly. Credit volume and interest rate respond strongly to monetary policy changes in 
the direction one would expect if we were estimating a supply response: after basic rate 
increases, bank interest rate increases and credit volume contracts. Second, we investigate 
whether bank structure matters for the transmission of monetary policy. In sharp contrast 
with existing literature, we find that, in Brazil, larger banks react more strongly to 
monetary policy than smaller banks. Responses are similar among foreign and domestic 
owned, and privately versus government-owned banks.  
Decomposing the impact of monetary policy according to bank size is interesting 
for two reasons. First and foremost, it is an important policy question per se, in light of 
recent changes in bank market structure. In particular, mergers in Brazil and other 
countries have produced larger banks. So the prediction is that monetary policy has more   5
power now. The second reason is identification. Part of the empirical literature (Kashyap 
and Stein [2000] and Arena et al [2007]) has typically assumed (but not having 
empirically shown) that large banks have better access to deposit substitutes because of 
informational and monitoring reasons. Papers then proceed to investigate whether large 
and small banks respond differently to shocks in monetary policy. They typically find 
that larger banks are less sensitive than small ones and interpret this as evidence in favor 
of the theory. We emphasize that, if it is assumed that supply reacts faster than demand to 
shocks in monetary policy, it’s not necessary to resort to assumptions about how size 
determines ability to solve informational and monitoring problems. Epistemologically, all 
we need is our assumption to be more convincing than the one in Kashyap and Stein 
[2000] and Arena et al [2007], a bar we believe we pass. 
Why are bank-size results different in Brazil and the US? We cannot answer this 
question definitely, but we may speculate. As we saw, the empirical literature has 
typically assumed as a valid hypothesis that large banks have better access to deposit 
substitutes because of informational reasons. In Brazil, it is not really obvious whether 
larger banks suffer less from opaqueness than smaller banks. Several small banks are 
publicly traded and receive wide coverage from sell-side analysts. In contrast, some of 
the largest banks are not publicly traded (or the Brazilian operation is not listed 
separately): CAIXA ECONÔMICA FEDERAL, HSBC, SAFRA and until very recently 
SANTANDER. Then, in contrast to the American banks, it is not clear whether smaller 
banks suffer more from informational problems. Numbers also make a difference. The 
Brazilian bank market has some 230 players (in contrast to more than 7,000 in the US). 
Large institutional depositors may be able to monitor a large proportion of small and mid-
sized banks in Brazil. In addition, in Brazil, small banks have a more concentrated 
deposit base than large banks. Thus, it is unclear whether moral hazard problems plague 
smaller or larger banks. In summary, the informational content of the bank lending 
channel may still be operative but it may well work the other way around in Brazil.  
Our results are important in terms of policy implications. With the caveat of 
external validity in mind, we find that large banks are more sensitive to monetary policy 
than smaller ones. With bank concentration increasing over time (a phenomenon not   6
particular to Brazil), our results suggest that monetary policy will have more power 
through the credit channel in the future.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the section II we provide an overview of the 
recent evolution of the Brazilian credit market and the description of our dataset. Section 
III highlights our empirical strategy, with emphasis on the identification strategy. Results 
are presented in section IV. Section V concludes with a discussion about policy 
implications. 
 
II. Background: the credit market in Brazil and monetary policy framework 
 
The performance of Brazilian credit markets is still poor by international 
standards. Spreads are high and credit volume is low even when compared to other 
emerging markets. Gelos (2006) calculates that the average interest rate margin in Brazil 
was 8.9%, while the emerging economies average was 5% and Latin American countries 
average was 8%
2. In the same paper the author shows that Brazilian credit to private 
sector-to-GDP ratio was the sixth smallest in a sample of sixteen countries, below those 
of Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Honduras.
3  
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the banks in our sample by total assets. A large 
number of small banks (187 banks with less than R$5 billion
4 in assets) represented, 
during the sample period, less than 14% of the industry’s total assets. In contrast, the 
large banks
5 (average total asset during the sample of more than R$25 billion, US$ 9.25 
billion) owned no less than two-thirds of the industry’s assets. The twenty-four medium-
                                                 
2 In table 1 of Gelos (2006) the interest rate margins, measured as the bank total interest rate income minus 
total interest rate expense divided by the sum of total interest bearing assets, were 6.6% for Mexico, 5.5% 
for Chile and 4% for Colombia. 
3 For the difficulties in international comparisons of bank spreads see Costa e Nakane (2005). For the 
methodological decomposition of bank spread between costs, taxes and profit margin in Brazil see Costa 
and Nakane (2004).  
4 Using the average exchange rate during the sample period (Nov 01 to Dec 06), 2.7019 R$/US$, R$ 5 
billion corresponds to US$ 1.85 billion. One should note, however, that volatility was very high during the 
sample period, which included a sudden stop episode in late 2002, when the exchange rate even touched 4 
R$/US$. 
5 From these, three are government-owned banks (the first, the second and the eleventh largest banks) and 
represented 29.6% of system total asset. Three are foreign banks and represented 12.4% of the system total 
assets. The remaining are domestic private banks and represented 58% of the system total asset. One of the 
banks in this group is not a retail bank, but instead its main market niche is wealth management, catering to 
rich clients and large companies.   7
sized banks amounted to 20.6% of the system total assets. A couple of important features 
for our empirical strategy emerge from graph 2. First, variation in bank size is abundant, 
so we are able to test if large and small banks react differently to monetary policy shocks. 
Second, the pass-through of marginal cost to prices depends on market power (Panzar 
and Rosse  (1987)), and the industry is rather concentrated. 
 
Table 1 shows the balance sheet of the banking sector. Panel A is the liability 
side. Time deposits are the largest category and represent some 20.2% of the industry’s 
liability.  
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*Source: Central Bank of Brasil, banking balancesheet accounts(COSIF)   8
 
 
The Brazilian banking industry has some peculiarities worth noting.
6 The first is 
the prominent presence of the public sector in financial intermediation. Government 
participation in the banking sector is high. Two out of the three largest commercial banks 
in Brazil are state-owned (Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal).
7 In 2006 they 
represented roughly 23% of all outstanding credit in the banking system. In addition, the 
federal government owns a very large development bank (BNDES) that alone was 
responsible for another 11% of all credit outstanding in 2006. In general, state-owned 
banks have preferential or exclusive access to sources of funds that are more stable and 
cheaper.
8 Some of this funding is earmarked to targeted sectors, such agricultural 
working capital loans, housing and trade finance for exports and imports. The remaining 
was market-based credit. Potentially important to our purposes, BNDES, the large 
development bank, funds working capital loans to SMEs through private banks using the 
low-cost funding from payroll deductions (see earmarked funds from domestic official 
institutions in table 1). In 2006, earmarked lending represented 15.1% of total lending. 
Finally, the Brazilian banking system relies little on time, demand and savings deposits 
for international standards (41% of bank’s liabilities). In terms of external validity, our 
results are contingent on intermediation with low reliance on deposits. 
                                                 
6 We are grateful to Arturo Galindo for calling our attention to this point. 
7 Banco do Brasil is the largest commercial bank and Caixa Econômica Federal is the third, when we 
measure bank’s size by total assets. Both are owned by the federal government. 
8 One example is the “judicial litigation deposits”, which are deposits for civil suits settlements that are not 
final. By law they have to be deposited in public banks, with regulated low rates, 6% real p.a., a low figure 
for Brazil (see below). Another important source are workers’ unemployment insurance funds   9
A short description of the Brazilian monetary policy framework is in place. After 
floating its currency, the real (BRL), in January, 1999, Brazil adopted inflation targeting 
(IT). The two-year-ahead inflation target is set every year (in early July) by the Monetary 
Policy Council, a committee composed by the Finance Minister, the Planning Minister, 
and the Central Bank Governor. This is supposed to reflect society’s preferences towards 
inflation. The Brazilian Central Bank has, so far, been de facto independent in carrying 
out the implementation of monetary policy to achieve the inflation target.  Currently, the 
Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM) meets every six weeks (initially, every four 
weeks) to decide upon the basic interest rate (the Selic rate). 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Our main data source is an original and unique call-report database from the 
Central Bank of Brazil.
9 Call reports have daily information, at the bank-type of loan 
level, on interest rates and volume of new loans, our two dependent variables. On a 
monthly basis, banks have to report data on maturity and default rates. The dataset 
contains only non-earmarked credit. Data run from June-2000 through December-2006.  
Loans are classified into six categories of consumer lending, and eleven types of 
credit to firms. Categories differ in several dimensions such as the presence of collateral, 
type of borrower, maturity of the credit, and whether rates are fixed or adjustable.
  
The main explanatory variable is the unexpected change in the basic interest rate, 
which is defined as the difference between the target set for the basic interest rate 
(hereafter SELIC) and the median of the market players’ expectations the day before the 
meeting (the so-called FOCUS survey, which is the equivalent of the market consensus), 
both publicly available. Expected changes in monetary policy should also have an impact 
on credit market. However, our identification strategy relies crucially on high frequency 
responses to changes in monetary policy. Since it is hard to determine when expected 
component was priced in, we work with the unexpected component only for 
identification reasons. The Focus survey began in November of 2001. Thus, our final 
sample period is November 2001 through December 2006. 
                                                 
9 Data are not publicly available for bank privacy reasons.   10
Figure 2 depicts the actual and unexpected SELIC changes. It shows large 
unexpected changes by the end of 2002, a period of macroeconomic instability that 
preceded the inauguration of President Lula. In the first meetings during the new 
administration, the market consensus (median) underestimated the increases in the 
SELIC, reflecting the central bank’s attempt to gain reputation. In the second semester of 
2003, the market underestimated the cuts in the SELIC. In 60% of the Monetary Policy 
Committee (COPOM) meetings, the consensus forecasts were right. Thus, variation is 






Tables 2 and 3 have pairwise correlations between changes in lending interest rate 
and Selic (unexpected and actual), and changes in new loans and Selic (unexpected and 
actual). Correlations suggest that it takes two days for changes in the basic rate to affect 
















Figure 2: Actual x Unexpected changes in selic rate
Actual selic rate changes Unexpected selic rate changes  11
unexpected changes in SELIC and lending rates (quantities) has the expected positive 
(negative) sign.  
 
Unexpected selic variation Actual selic variation
interest t+1 -0.04 -0.01
interest t+2 -0.06 -0.05
interest t+3 0.10 0.09
interest t+4 0.13 0.26
interest t+5 0.12 0.13
Unexpected selic variation Actual selic variation
interest t+1 -0.04 -0.09
interest t+2 -0.03 -0.12
interest t+3 -0.12 -0.18
interest t+4 -0.06 -0.17
interest t+5 0.14 0.04
Unexpected selic variation Actual selic variation
interest t+1 0.03 -0.03
interest t+2 -0.002 -0.07
interest t+3 -0.06 -0.10
interest t+4 0.07 0.09
interest t+5 0.08 0.01
*Source: Own elaboration from the Central Bank of Brazil data. The definitions of
the variables are the following: interest t+1 is the difference between the average
credit annual interest rate one day after the monetary policy committee meeting and
the average interest rate one day before the meeting; interest t+2 is the difference
between the average credit annual interest rate two days after the monetary policy
committee meeting and the average interest rate one day before the meeting; the
same logic applies to higher order differences.
Table 2 - Correlations between selic and lending interest rate*
Large banks
Medium banks
Small banks  12
 
Following the literature, we decompose the impact of monetary according to bank 
size, and different categories have distinct funding profiles. Consider the size taxonomy 
of figure 1. Table 4 shows deposits as a proportion of total liabilities for the three bank 
size categories (large, medium and small).  
 
Unexpected selic variation Actual selic variation
new_loans t+1 0.07 -0.15
new_loans t+2 0.061 -0.09
new_loans t+3 -0.13 -0.19
new_loans t+4 -0.11 -0.31
new_loans t+5 0.14 -0.02
Unexpected selic variation Actual selic variation
new_loans t+1 0.04 -0.11
new_loans t+2 0.07 -0.11
new_loans t+3 -0.02 -0.11
new_loans t+4 -0.11 -0.31
new_loans t+5 0.17 0.02
Unexpected selic variation Actual selic variation
new_loans t+1 -0.05 -0.17
new_loans t+2 0.01 -0.15
new_loans t+3 -0.07 -0.10
new_loans t+4 -0.07 -0.24
new_loans t+5 0.17 0.01
*Source: Own elaboration from the Central Bank of Brazil data. The definitions of
the variables are the following: new_loans t+1 is the difference between the average
volume of new loans one day after the monetary policy committee meeting and the
average volume of new loans one day before the meeting; new_loans t+2 is the
difference between the average volume of new loans two days after the monetary
policy committee meeting and the average volume of new loans one day before the
meeting; the same logic applies to higher order differences.
Table 3 - Correlations between selic and new loans*
Large banks
Medium banks
Small banks  13
 
 
Clear differences in funding strategies operation emerge. Large banks have the 
highest percentage of their liability as deposits. Nevertheless, smaller banks have more 
deposits than medium-sized banks. This is true for both sub-categories of deposits (time 
and demand), but demand deposits are only relevant for large banks. Savings deposits 
monotonically decrease with size.  
Some of the facts in table 4 are unsurprising. Banks must have branches all over 
the country in order to be able to compete for the demand and saving deposits. The time 
deposits market is segmented between large denomination CDs and the “retail” market 
for individuals. Small and medium size banks are able to get funding in the wholesale 
CDs market. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
 
Identifying the banks’ lending reactions is akin to the standard problem of 
estimating demand and supply relations in microeconometrics. The bank lending channel 
refers to the supply side of the credit market, but we typically observe only equilibrium 
values. Following a monetary policy shock, it is conceivable that not only the supply of 
Total deposits/liabilityDemand deposits/liability Time deposits/liabilitySaving deposits/liability
average 45.7 8.1 23.4 14.2
median 45.6 8.9 22.0 12.4
minimum 25.8 2.9 3.2 1.2
maximum 74.7 13.0 43.6 31.3
Total deposits/liabilityDemand deposits/liability Time deposits/liabilitySaving deposits/liability
average 20.7 2.5 14 4.6
median 18.1 0.7 11 0
minimum 0 0 0 0
maximum 65.2 9 38 29.1
Total deposits/liabilityDemand deposits/liability Time deposits/liabilitySaving deposits/liability
average 33.8 3.5 29 1.2
median 25.5 0.5 20 0
minimum 0 0 0 0
maximum 98.1 67 98 37.3
*Source: Own elaboration from banks' balance sheet accounts (Cosif, Central Bank of Brazil) 
Table 4: Deposit funding by bank's size - % of total liability*
Large banks
Medium banks
Small banks  14
credit shifts, but also demand for credit, a problem first recognized by Kashyap and Stein 
(1994). 
Existing empirical literature has used bank characteristics to isolate demand 
factors (Kashyap and Stein (2000), Arena et al (2007)). The key identifying assumption is 
that banks differ in their abilities to substitute away from deposits. Furthermore, 
observable characteristics determine the ability to move to and from deposits. In this 
case, one may interpret different reactions to monetary policy as evidence of the bank 
lending channel. Typically, one assumes that larger, more liquid and foreign owned (in 
emerging countries) banks are better equipped to move to and from deposits. The 
theoretical motivation behind these assumptions is as follows. The presence of deposit 
insurance makes deposits free of informational asymmetries, thereby becoming the 
cheapest and more stable way to fund bank credit operations. When forced to raise 
equity, long-term debt and short-term wholesale debt, banks have to pay dearly for 
informational asymmetries and non-contractibilities. In this context, larger banks, perhaps 
because of too-big-to--fail effect or because they are easier to monitor, pay less when 
substituting away from deposits to these more expensive instruments (see Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) and Stein (1998)). The same would apply for foreign banks in emerging 
countries. Liquidity also matters because, if banks have very liquid instruments in the 
asset part of the balance sheet, they may sell position when facing funding shortage. 
Finally, banks follow distinct strategies for funding. In Brazil, as Table 4 shows, larger 
banks have a stronger reliance on deposits than smaller banks, although the industry’s as 
a whole relies little on deposits in an international comparison.
10 
Regardless of the empirical validity of such theoretical arguments, banks with 
characteristics serve different clientele. In this case, equilibrium reaction to monetary 
policy may differ for demand reasons: different borrowers may react differently to 
monetary policy shocks. For example, middle-market banks specialize in receivables’ 
discounting for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Large universal banks, in 
addition to discounting, do short and medium term working capital loans for larger firms. 
It is quite conceivable that large firms will reduce their working capital demand in 
                                                 
10 Among Latin American countries, the Brazilian banking system has the lowest Deposits-to-Liabilities 
ratio, 41%. The average is 65%. We kindly thank Arturo Galindo for pointing this out and sending out the 
data on different Latin American countries.   15
response to monetary tightening, but SMEs will not cut so fast their demand for 
discounting. Furthermore, consumer credit is highly concentrated in larger banks, and 
consumption and investment may react very differently to monetary policy. 
In contrast with the literature, our main identification strategy is data-driven. A 
well established fact in monetary economics is that output and inflation are only slowly 
affected by the traditional monetary policy mechanism (see Christiano et al (1999), 
among many others
11).
 In the short run, consumption and investment decisions have some 
inertia. Since monetary policy affects banks’ marginal cost immediately for several 
products, credit supply should react faster to monetary policy than credit demand. Using 
daily data and focusing on few days before and after the monetary policy committee 
meeting, we are confident we are recovering only systematic supply shifts. In addition to 
high frequency, we have information about flows, i.e., new loans. This is crucial for our 
strategy to be successful because stocks hardly move much in the very short-run. Another 
advantage  vis-à-vis the literature, we have data on interest rate, which is useful to 
corroborate that we capture supply shocks: supply and demand shocks to monetary policy 
have similar implications for quantities, but opposite implications for interest rates. 
Finally, we also follow the literature and decompose the response to monetary policy 
according to bank characteristics, i.e., size, ownership and liquidity. 
In the event study, we compare the amount of new loans issued and interest rates 
charged on a few days before and after the monetary policy committee meeting to set a 
new target for the basic interest rate. We use only the surprise of the announcement, i.e., 
the difference between the median expected change in the basic interest rate (day before 
the meeting) and the actual change.
12 In doing so, we mitigate the possibility that most 
effects of policy announcement may have occurred way before the meeting.  
 




                                                 
11 The famous expression coined by Friedman [1972] is that monetary policy works with “long and variable 
lags.”  
12 As a robustness test we used the actual interest rate changes too. Results are available upon request.   16
 
                                    
            
            
                                                            







The subscript i refers to the bank, j refers to the type of credit, and the dimension t 
to the period, an event, i.e., a meeting of the monetary policy committee. In other words, t 
+ N means N days after the day the committee announced the new rate. Correspondingly, 
t – 1 is the day before the meeting. Thus,    _           is the amount  at N
th day after 
the committee’s meeting. In some specifications we include fixed-effect dummies for the 
pair bank-type of credit. The coefficients of interest are β2, β3 , γ2 and γ3. β2 and γ2 are 
expected to be negative and positive, respectively, if are to capture a supply effect. The 
signs of β3 and γ3 are less clear-cut. For example, the standard assumption in the literature 
is that larger banks are less restricted in funding options. In this case, we would expect β3 
and γ3 to be negative and positive, respectively. We also estimated the models with two 
different dependent variables: log(New Loanst+N/ New Loanst-1+N) and the percentage 
change in new loans. Results are similar and are available upon request.
13  
  One legitimate  concern  with  the  specification is whether changes in SELIC 
(expected or unexpected) truly reflect the changes in cost of funds. SELIC is a short-term 
rate, and some loans have longer maturity and, in theory, we should look at the whole 
yield curve. We deal with this problem empirically. Table A.V in the appendix shows 
                                                 
13 We use several observations of different types of credit for the same pair bank-event. Thus, errors might 
be correlated and we cluster errors at bank-event level for the baseline model and results are slightly more 
precise than when we use only robust standard errors. Results are shown in the appendix. 
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two things. First, the average maturity of loans in Brazil is short: 7 months. Then, short-
term rates seem appropriate. Second, there is heterogeneity in maturity among different 
types of loans. So, if estimates are not sensitive to the type of loan considered, SELIC is 




IV.A. General effects of monetary policy 
IV.A.1 Main estimates 
 







N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
Δunexpected_selic .17*** .015 -.29*** -.11***
(.048) (.032) (.048) (.025)
N obs  45532 45480 45255 45030
N groups 1090 1087 1085 1083
† Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 5: Effect on new loans without decomposition
Dependent variable: New Loans t+N - New Loans t-1†
Robust standard deviation in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
Δunexpected_selic -.64*** -.69*** .63*** 1.4***
(.2) (.19) (.18) (.18)
N obs  27060 27097 27022 26633
N groups 810 812 811 803
† Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 6: Effect on interest rates without decomposition
Dependent variable: Interest rate t+N - Interest rate t-1†
Robust standard deviation in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  18
The results show that unexpected changes in the SELIC rate have a negative and 
statistical significant effect on new loans, and a positive and statistical significant effect 
on lending interest rate on the third and fourth days after the committee’s meeting. In 
days 1 and 2, results are reversed. We prefer results for days 3 and 4 for four reasons. 
First, they are more consistent than results for days 1 and 2. In fact, day 2’s the impact on 
quantity is zero. Second, banks may hesitate to move on the very first days, to avoid 
moving alone. This is yet more important for small banks, which may act as followers. In 
fact, when we decompose observations by size, we see that results for days 1 and 2 for 
larger banks are inconsistent for prices and quantities (see tables 9 and 10 below). Third, 
there is a delay between the contract date and the fund release date. For example, the 
contract date could be one day after the meeting, but the actual release of the fund could 
be two or three days after. The same kind of effect could affect the new loans one and 
two days after the meeting: in this case at least part of the loans actually refers to the day 
of the meeting (or even prior), which is not affected by the new information about basic 
interest rate. Last, but not least, results for days 3 and 4 have theoretical support: they 
represent a supply shift. Even if they were consistent, it would be hard to interpret results 
for days 1 and 2 because they are compatible with demand, not supply, and demand 
should not respond this quickly. Thus, throughout the discussion, we focus on days 3 and 
4.  
In quantitative terms, an unexpected increase of the Selic rate of 1% per year 
implies a drop
14 of average daily new loans of R$290 thousand (US$ 107 thousand, about 
11% of the average value of the new loans in the sample). Industry wide this means an 
impact of R$57.7 million (US$ 21.3 million, approximately 2.7% of the average value of 
the industry new loans in the sample).
 15  
The effect of SELIC on credit interest rate is positive and statistically significant 
in windows 3 and 4. The estimated pass-through in the 3-days window is less than one, 
which means that not all Selic’s variation is passed on credit interest rate. This stickiness 
is compatible with market power (Panzar and Rosse (1987)) or with adverse selection in 
                                                 
14 These calculations use the 3-days window results. 
15We use several observations of several different types of credit for the same pair bank-event. Thus, errors 
might be correlated and we cluster errors at bank-event level for the baseline model and results are slightly 
more precise than when we use only robust standard errors. Results are shown in the appendix.   19
credit markets as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The signs and magnitudes of our estimated 
responses to SELIC for the 3 and 4-days windows are compatible with supply but not 
demand shifts, corroborating our identification strategy.      
 
IV.A.2 Robustness checks 
 
  Figure 1 shows that our sample contains only a few large banks. By equally 
weighting, the documented differences come mostly from differences between medium 
and small ones. To prove our results, we weight observations by bank size. Results, 
which are similar, are in tables A.I and A.II of the appendix.  
  Figure 2 shows that our sample contains several events in 2002, a year of 
economic turmoil in Brazil. Therefore, our results may be driven by crisis periods. We re-
estimate the model excluding all events from 2002. Results, which are similar, are in 
tables A.III and A.IV of the appendix.  
Another important issue concerns the possibility of hoarding. If announcements 
are made at pre-announced dates, lenders (or banks) may hoard loan applications until the 
uncertainty is uncovered. Two comments are in place. First, hoarding applies only to 
quantities, not interest rates.  Second, we take steps to address the possibility that 
hoarding mechanically produces the results for quantities. If hoarding is in fact relevant 
empirically, we should observe that new loan concessions should be lower in the days 
immediately preceding the COPOM meetings than, say, 7 to 10 days before the meeting. 
This is irrespective of whether SELIC rates surprise up or down. Table A.VI in the 
appendix shows that this is not the case. 
 
IV.B Size Decomposition 
 
In this subsection we follow the literature and estimate models (1)B and (2)B 
decomposing the impact of monetary policy according to bank size. The intuition is that 
as larger banks have more collateral to offer, they probably will find easier to trade 
deposits for other kind of debts. Furthermore, investors could be more willing to buy 
shares of larger banks if they thought government saw them as too big to fail. We use the   20








                                                 
16 The results using size could be generated by the larger amount of medium and small banks in our sample. 
In order to deal with this possible problem we estimated the same model of this section including weights 
based on the sample average size of each bank. Results are showed in the tables A.I and A.II of the 
appendix. We can see that results are not qualitatively different from those of tables 6 and 7.    21
In line with our previous estimates, banks’ reactions to changes in monetary 
policy are again compatible with a supply response: they increase lending interest rates 
and contract new loans after a monetary policy contraction. 
Results on the interaction term are in sharp contrast with existing literature. If 
large banks were better equipped in substituting away from deposits, they should respond 
less strongly to changes in monetary policy. In fact, they respond more strongly. Using 
estimates in tables 7 and 8, tables 9 and 10 show the average response for the three 
groups of banks: small, medium and large sized. In general, small banks do not respond 
to shocks in monetary policy. On the other hand, among large banks a one percentage-
point unexpected increase in the SELIC rate causes an average daily reduction of R$1.24 
million (US$ 459 thousand), which means an average aggregate daily reduction of 
R$13.6 million (US$ 5.03 million, approximated 8.8% of the average value of the large 
banks new loans in the sample). Accordingly, interest rates charged by small banks is 
insensitive to unexpected changes in monetary policy and a one percentage-point 
unexpected increase in the SELIC rate causes a increase of 2.13 percentage points in the 






                                                 
17 Figure 2 shows that five events of unexpected changes in Selic occurred in 2002, a year of economic 
crisis in Brazil. To ensure that results are not confined to crisis period, we re-estimated the model of this 
section excluding 2002. Tables A.III and A.IV of the appendix have the results, which are qualitatively 




IV.C Decomposition according to different types of loans 
 
 
  Banks of different sizes serve different clienteles. Our identification strategy is 
tailored to isolate supply shocks. Nevertheless, identification is cleanest if one could 
restrict attention to a homogeneous class of borrowers. Furthermore, focusing on a 
homogeneous class of borrowers, we would estimate the supply shock for the same 
demand elasticity. We have no data on the borrower side but we do have information on 
the type of credit, which is a good proxy for type of borrower. Tables 11, 12, 13 and 14 
are analogous to tables 9 and 10, but the sample is restricted to working capital (tables 11 
and 12) and consumer credit (tables 13 and 14). Results are similar to those in tables 9 






                                                 
18 We omit the analogous of tables 7 and 8 (all types of credit) for working capital and consumer credit. 
Results, which are very similar to those in tables 7 and 8, are available upon request. 








IV.D Liquidity  
 
The second decomposition is done according to asset liquidity. Banks with more 
liquidity assets (say, government bonds) have better collateral to post, allowing them to 
substitute away from deposits if they become too expensive. In addition, banks may sell 
liquid assets if conditions get too tight. 




it it Assets Total liquidity   =  24
 
 






Contrary to theoretical arguments, estimates show that liquidity does not appear to 
influence the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel.   25
 
IV.E Deposits and Earmarked Funds 
 
   The credit channel of monetary policy operates mainly through its impact on the 
cost of funds to banks. Deposits, a form of short-term debt, are immediately affected by 
changes in the basic rate. Thus, one should conjecture that the impact of monetary policy 
depends on the proportion of deposits different banks hold in their liabilities. In fact, as 
Table 4 shows, larger banks rely more on demand deposits than smaller ones. Because of 
that, results in subsection IV.B may be due to different liability composition (see 





N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
%demand deposits -.016 .31 .065 -.28
(.35) (.3) (.32) (.28)
Δunexpected_selic .1*** .00072 -.21*** -.088***
(.035) (.024) (.035) (.02)
Δunexpected_selic x %demand deposits 1.3*** .28 -1.5*** -.39**
(.43) (.26) (.44) (.2)
N obs  45442 45404 45181 44956
N groups 1090 1087 1085 1083
† Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 17: Effect on new loans by demand deposits
Dependent variable: New Loans t+N - New Loans t-1†
Robust standard deviation in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  26
 
 
In line with the conjecture, Tables 17 and 18 show that banks rely more on 
deposits for their funding respond more to changes in monetary policy. This is true for 
both on interest rates and loan concessions at the same three and four day window.  Small 
and large banks differ in their funding strategy. Then, it is important to check whether 
results in tables 8 and 9 are robust to controlling for difference in funding strategy (see 
tables 23 and 24 below). 
Also on the liability side, banks receive funding from the government through 
some programs. BNDES earmarked for working capital to small and medium-sized firms 
is the largest component of this kind of fund. These loans have variable but regulated 
rates and, by construction, should respond less to shocks on monetary policy. Tables 19 
and 20 have the estimates of the models (1)B and (2)B decomposed by BNDES funding 
as a percentage liabilities. 
 
N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
%demand deposits -.66 2.1 1.4 -6.2*
(3.2) (3.8) (3.2) (3.3)
Δunexpected_selic -.69** -.61*** .55** 1***
(.27) (.24) (.24) (.22)
Δunexpected_selic x %demand deposits 1.1 -1.4 1.3 5.4***
(2.1) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8)
N obs  27006 27048 26976 26584
N groups 810 811 811 803
† Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 18: Effect on interest rates by demand deposits
Dependent variable: Interest rate t+N - Interest rate t-1†
Robust standard deviation in parentheses





In line with expectations, banks with a large share of earmarked BNDES funding 
are less sensitive to changes in monetary policy. Again, banks differ in their reliance on 
earmarked funds. Thus, as previously emphasized, it is important to check whether 
results in tables 8 and 9 are robust to controlling for difference in earmarked funding (see 




N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
%earmarked funds -.018 -.075 -.24 -.21
(.22) (.22) (.22) (.2)
Δunexpected_selic .18*** .015 -.31*** -.12***
(.052) (.034) (.051) (.026)
Δunexpected_selic x %earmarked funds -.16* .0059 .31*** .14***
(.091) (.063) (.094) (.05)
N obs  45442 45404 45181 44956
N groups 1090 1087 1085 1083
† Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 19: Effect on new loans by earmarked funds
Dependent variable: New Loans t+N - New Loans t-1†
Robust standard deviation in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
N=1 N=2 N=3 N=4
%earmarked funds .38 2.4 2.8 3.6
(2.5) (2.3) (2.4) (2.3)
Δunexpected_selic -.65*** -.84*** .55*** 1.4***
(.21) (.21) (.21) (.19)
Δunexpected_selic x %earmarked funds .4 2.8*** 1.4 .36
(1.2) (1) (1.1) (1)
N obs  27006 27048 26976 26584
N groups 810 811 811 803
† Source: Central Bank of Brazil
Table 20: Effect on interest rates by earmarked funds
Dependent variable: Interest rate t+N - Interest rate t-1†
Robust standard deviation in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  28
Previous literature has found that ownership matters for the credit channel. Arena 
et al (2007) argue that foreign banks may have smaller sensitivity to changes in the basic 
interest rate because of access to a larger deposit base outside the country. So, foreign 
banks would be less likely to be financially restricted in the debt market. State-owned 
banks may also respond differently from privately owned banks for two reasons. First, 
their deposits base is more stable and less costly (savings accounts, whose interest rates 
are regulated), giving them an advantage in responding to deposit shocks. Second, state-
owned banks are likely to have a different objective function. Tables 21 and 22 have the 








As suggested by previous results, banks respond (at day 3 and 4) to an increase in 
SELIC by reducing new loans and increasing interest rates. Interestingly, government-
owned banks’ responses are somewhat stronger than private ones (both domestic and 
foreign), although the difference is not statistically significant. Government-owned banks 
are larger than average, making it crucial to check whether the size effect is not an 
ownership effect. 
 
IV.F Horse-racing all decompositions 
 
So far, results suggest that only size matters. Here we estimate one big model with 
all decomposition to have a clearer picture of which ones are more important. Tables 22 
and 23 show the results. 
   30
 




When we horse-race all explanations, results are somewhat similar to those we get 
when estimating the models separately. We find that a stronger response by larger banks 
(reduce more new loans and increase more the interest rate). Banks whose funding rely 
more on deposits increase their interest rates more, as expected, but we find no results on 
quantities. Thus, we do not find these results conclusive. A higher proportion of 
earmarked funds is associated with a damped response in quantities, but no response in   32
interest rate. This is precisely as expected: earmarked funds are passed on with regulated 




  We studied the monetary policy transmission mechanism that works through bank 
credit in Brazil: the bank lending channel. We had access to a unique data set that include 
all bank credit concessions (above a threshold) in Brazil, both to firms and people. The 
data include the loan amount and the interest rate charged. We use the daily frequency of 
the new loans and interest rate information to identify bank credit supply responses to 
monetary policy shocks (unexpected basic interest rate changes) in a cleaner way than in 
the previous literature.  
In contrast to the existing empirical literature for other countries, in Brazil, larger 
banks respond more to shocks in monetary policy than smaller ones. We do not interpret 
this result as evidence contrary to the theoretical mechanism behind the bank lending 
channel. The empirical literature typically uses US data (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox 
(1993), Kashyap, Stein (2000)). The assumption – reasonable for the US - is that 
informational asymmetries and moral hazard problems plague smaller banks more than 
large ones. In Brazil the assumption is much less obviously true.  
Our results have potentially important implications for the conduct of monetary 
policy in Brazil. The impact of changes in the basic interest rate (SELIC) is transmitted 
more strongly by larger banks, which hold the largest share of loans in the economy, 
increasing the power of monetary policy. Furthermore, market structure has been 
changing. In particular, consolidation has increased the size of a typical bank. Our results 
suggest that the power of the monetary policy through the credit channel will increase 
overtime. 
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